Labor market aggregates tell a consistent story regarding the magnitude of the employment declines that occurred during the Great Recession. Between July 2007 and July 2009, the all-adult employment to population ratio declined by nearly 5 percentage points. The unemployment rate rose by a similar amount. Crises in housing and financial markets had taken their toll on the U.S. labor market.
Subsequent labor market developments have proven more difficult to interpret. Between July 2009 and July 2013, the unemployment rate rebounded sufficiently to erase half of its prior increase. The employment to population ratio recovered little, however, as the unemployment rate's recovery involved significant labor force exit.
In this research note, we characterize the demographic and cross-country dimensions of this period's labor market developments. We proceed in the following steps. First, we graphically display the evolution of a set of standard labor market aggregates, namely the employment, unemployment, and labor force participation rates, for the full population of U.S. adults. Second, we separately present these aggregates for young adults, prime-aged adults, and the near elderly. Third, we place the U.S. employment experience into its international context. Finally, we explore the extent to which declines in employment among young adults have been associated with increases in school enrollment. Throughout, we consider the data's implications for the potential role of purely demographic forces as explanations for the sustained slump in U.S. employment.
We summarize our conclusions as follows. U.S. employment declines were dramatic among young adults, substantial among prime-aged adults, and generally larger than those that occurred in other advanced economies. Recent analyses attribute a 1.3 to 1.6 percentage point decline in the U.S. labor force participation rate to population aging (Council of Economic Advisers, 2014; Aaronson et al., 2014) . These estimates point to aging as a cause of as much as one half of the decline in the labor force participation rate and one third of the overall employment decline. The data we present suggest that these estimates likely represent an upper bound on aging's potential contribution to these developments.
Substantial declines in the employment of non-elderly adults highlights the necessity of looking beyond population aging. Aging can explain neither the 4 percentage point decline in the employment rate of prime-aged adults nor the 8 percentage point decline in young adult employment. The size of the U.S. employment slump relative to declines in European labor markets casts further doubt on the hypothesis that purely demographic trends are the primary source of recent developments.
While the substantial decline in young adult employment remains little understood, recent analyses point to trends in educational attainment as a potential, partial explanation (Council of Economic Advisers, 2014; Aaronson et al., 2014) . We provide new evidence on the plausibility of the link between changes in participation, employment, and school enrollment by comparing changes across relatively narrow demographic groups.
Across sub-groups of young adults categorized by age, gender, and race/ethnicity, there was essentially no correlation between this period's changes in rates of enrollment and either employment or labor force participation. Changes in enrollment per se thus appear unlikely to underlie any more than a very small fraction of the 8 percentage point decline in young adult employment.
Aggregate U.S. Labor Market Developments
The panels of figure 1 present the recent evolution of three broad labor market aggregates for all U.S. persons aged 15 and over. Panel A presents the employment to population ratio. Between July 2005 and July 2007, this ratio was relatively stable at 63 percent. Over the course of the Great Recession, it declined by nearly 5 percentage points to just over 58 percent. Between July 2009 and July 2013, the employment to pop-ulation ratio recovered little. Over the subsequent year (not pictured), it recovered by 0.3 percentage point. This sustained, post-recession slump in the employment to population ratio compactly characterizes the labor market's sluggishness.
Panel B presents the evolution of the unemployment rate for all persons aged 15 and over. Like the employment to population ratio, the unemployment rate was relatively stable, at 5 percent, between July 2005 and July 2007. It then rose by roughly 5 percentage points, to 10 percent, between July 2007 and July 2009. Unlike the employment to population ratio, the unemployment rate has recovered non-trivially towards its pre-recession levels. Between July 2009 and July 2013, it steadily declined to just over 7 percentage points. Over the subsequent year (not pictured) it declined by an additional percentage point.
Panel C presents the evolution of the labor force participation rate for all persons aged 15 and over. Like the previous two series, the labor force participation rate was relatively stable between July 2005 and July 2007, edging down slightly over the interval's latter months. Unlike the previous series, labor force participation evolved relatively smoothly over the course of the Great Recession and subsequent recovery. From July 2009 through July 2013 the labor force participation rate declined steadily from 66 percent to 63 percent. This 3 percentage point decline, coupled with the unemployment rate's partial recovery, underlie the employment to population ratio's sustained decline of more than 4 percentage points. Like the unemployment rate, labor force participation declined by nearly a full percentage point over the subsequent year (i.e., from July 2013 to July 2014).
Employment Trends across Age Groups
We further characterize U.S. labor market developments by separately examining employment trends among young adults (aged 15 to 24), prime-aged adults (aged 25 to 54), and near elderly adults (aged 55 to 64). We organize the data as follows. Figure 2 presents the evolution of the employment to population ratio, with separate panels for all working-age adults, young adults, prime-aged adults, and the near elderly. Figure 3 similarly presents the evolution of the unemployment rate, while figure 4 presents the evolution of the labor force participation rate.
The Facts
Figure 2 reveals that the employment rate declined rather dramatically for young adults, significantly for prime-aged adults, and essentially not at all for the near el- it recovered by less than 1 percentage point. Following an arc of decline and recovery, the employment rate of adults aged 55 to 64 stood at 61 percent in July 2013. This was precisely the level at which it stood in July 2005. Figure 3 shows that the unemployment rate followed broadly similar patterns across age groups. For each group, the unemployment rate exhibited a significant increase during the Great Recession. Subsequent recoveries had, in each instance, erased roughly half of these losses by July 2013. While the patterns are similar, the magnitudes of these changes vary significantly across age groups. The initial increase in the unemployment rate was roughly 8 percentage points among young adults, 5 percentage points among prime-aged adults, and 3.5 percentage points among the near elderly. 
Questions of Interpretation
We consider these data in light of recent analyses by the Council of Economic Advisers (2014), Aaronson et al. (2014), and Hall (2014) . An important clarifying distinction between these studies involves the aggregates on which they focus. The Council of Economic Advisers (2014) labor force exit and elevated unemployment rates had both contributed substantially to the shortfall of U.S. output relative to trend. Here again, it is useful to look to the labor market experience of prime-aged adults, which cannot plausibly be attributed to aging. This group's employment rate declined by a substantial 4 percentage points, while even younger adults' employment rate fell by 8 percentage points. Factors other than aging thus appear likely to underlie most of the recent U.S. experience.
The International Experience
Figures 5 and 6 place the U.S. employment experience into its international context. For the full working-age population, U.S. employment declined substantially by international standards. On average across the OECD, employment declined by less than 1 percentage point. The decline experienced in the United States was larger than that in 2 All data come from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database.
3 For more on the German experience, see Burda and Hunt (2011) and Hoffmann and Lemieux (2014). all countries presented outside of Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. Relative to the United States, employment in a number of advanced economies proved considerably more robust. 4 Figure 6 presents cross-country data on changes in the employment of young and prime-aged adults. Declines for prime-aged adults are displayed on the x-axis and declines for young adults on the y-axis. The U.S. changes in employment emerge once again as being relatively large and negative. Outside of the experiences of Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, the U.S. lies near the bottom of both distributions.
We draw two lessons from these cross-country data. First, the dramatic variation across countries is of interest in its own right and in need of further study. Even ex- female enrollment rose slightly more than male enrollment, employment declines were larger for males than for females. Over this time period, the young adult male labor force participation rate declined from 63 percent to 57 percent; for females it declined from 58 percent to 54 percent. As of July 2013, the young adult male employment rate remained down by 10 percentage points from its pre-recession levels. The female employment rate 5 Aaronson et al. (2014) observe that a portion of the decline in participation among enrollees may reflect an increase in educational intensity on the intensive margin. They note that such changes in the labor supply of high school enrollees, in particular, would be consistent with shifting patterns of time use documented by Ramey and Ramey (2010) . remained down by a smaller but still substantial 7 percentage points. Figures 7 and 8 are based directly on data downloadable through the FRED database. This restricts us to plotting the employment of teenage blacks and whites rather than all young adult blacks and whites. In figures 9 and 10 we turn to data from the American Community Survey, in which we are at liberty to construct series on whatever demographic bases we desire. In the latter figures, comparisons across genders and racial and ethnic groups are thus made on a more similar basis. among young Hispanic males were sufficient to make the overall correlation between enrollment and employment changes modestly negative. Employment declines were particularly large among Hispanic and white male teenagers, while employment was relatively robust among Hispanic females aged 21 to 24.
The absence of an economically meaningful correlation between changes in employment and enrollment rates casts doubt on enrollment trends as an underlying cause of employment declines. Further, we note that the presence of a negative correlation would not, by itself, answer policy-relevant questions regarding the underlying mechanisms.
The choice between enrollment and work should respond to the relative returns of these activities. Substitution of schooling for work could be viewed as a positive development if it reflects absolute improvements in the opportunities made possible by advanced degrees. If the underlying forces have eroded the opportunities available to those with no post-secondary education, however, concern may be the more appropriate response. 7
Conclusion
U.S. labor markets have recovered much more slowly and less completely from the Great Recession than one might have hoped. The sustained employment decline was particularly pronounced among young adults. As shown above, changes in school enrollment across sub-groups of the young-adult population predict very little of the variation in this period's employment changes. Factors other then trends towards higher enrollment rates thus appear to be at work. The decline in the employment rate of prime-aged adults was also quite large by both historical and international standards.
As emphasized above, explanations for employment declines among both young and prime-aged adults necessarily involve forces other than population aging. We conclude by discussing additional factors that may have contributed to these declines. While most of these factors have received at least some attention in recent research, consensus has not been reached regarding their relative importance.
A variety of non-demographic explanations for the U.S. employment slump have been advanced. We divide them into two broad categories and briefly note their potential policy implications. Our first broad category includes macroeconomic factors associated with business cycles. DeLong and Summers (2012), for example, emphasize the potential role of "hysteresis" effects through which a severe downturn may have sustained, negative impacts on an economy's performance. To the extent to which such forces are at work, stimulus-oriented policies may be an appropriate response. Baker et al. (2013) present evidence that the Great Recession was coupled with sustained, elevated levels of policy uncertainty, which other work has linked directly to macroeconomic performance (Bloom, 2009; Shoag and Veuger, 2014) . From a policy perspective, the "solution" to such uncertainties may simply be to cease with uncertainty generating policy making. 8
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